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Introduction
Military theorists and strategists will argue for years whether or not certain operations or conflicts provide us with a paradigm of operational art or merely an aberration not worthy of operational study or analysis of lessons learned. This argument makes little sense because every conflict possesses peculiarities. It is not likely that we will ever experience another bloody war of attrition between the states. Nor, is it probable that America will ever ally with Russia to defeat an imperial alliance between a
European and Asian country in a conflict that ends with a nuclear strike again either. The peculiarities of the American Civil War and World War II hardly disqualify them from the list of conflicts that theorists and strategists use to analyze and learn from. Operations DESERT SHIELD and STORM are no different and we learned much from this conflict over the last six years despite its many unique attributes. We have determined that its success resulted from: clear and concise national policy, sound joint doctrine, years of effective training management, first class equipment, and tough, patriotic military personnel dedicated to mission accomplishment. Nevertheless, it may be the last major conventional conflict for massive air, naval, and armor or mechanized ground forces (designed for the Fulda Gap clash of bipolar superpowers) for quite some time.
Therefore, study of those lessons learned, in many ways, may lack relevance to our current military situation and structure.
The purpose of this paper is to display Operation JUST CAUSE as a realistic model for study and application of Joint Vision (JV) 2010 operational concepts and how U.S. armed forces will fight in the 21st century. By no means does this paper contend that JUST CAUSE was a flawless operation. There were mistakes. Indeed, many argue that it, too, was an anomaly because U. The White House had given clear guidance. With these objectives in mind, strategic and operational commanders pulled this large undertaking together. In terms of operational art, commanders must design, organize, and conduct campaigns and major operations that attain strategic goals.
14 JUST CAUSE qualifies best as a major operation.
One of the initial challenges regarding analysis of JUST CAUSE is in defining the levels of war in which it occurred. Clearly, the NCA and CinC SOUTHCOM, General SOUTHCOM planners understood the political and military objectives and correctly identified the enemy's strategic and operational centers of gravity. The strategic center of gravity was Noriega. "As long as the PDF leader remained in power, he could still serve as a rallying point for the Panamanian military and the Dignity Battalions." 16 His capture was a stated military objective and a key to success. The PDF gave Noriega his strength. Consequently, the enemy armed forces were the operational center of gravity.
In order to strike at these centers of gravity, strategic airlift enabled operational commanders to position and employ widely dispersed air and land forces. By deploying sufficient troops in a dominant maneuver to add 14,000 troops to the 12,000 already stationed in Panama, U.S. forces moved into a position of "decisive advantage" over the enemy. Figure 1 shows how 63 C-141s, 19 C-130s, and 2 C-5s airlifted troops from Fort Bragg, NC, Fort Lewis, WA, Fort Benning, GA, Fort Ord, CA, and Fort Polk, LA in 24 hours. "27 targets were struck simultaneously by a combined force of U.S. Army Rangers, paratroops, light infantry, Navy SEALs (sea-air-land teams), and marines supported by helicopter gun ships, attack aircraft, and light armored vehicles." 21 After some savage but brief fighting, enemy command and control was neutralized and the PDF lost cohesion.
Ranger battalion
While some units persisted for a few days, organized PDF resistance was destroyed within the first 24 hours. JUST CAUSE highlights premier examples of precision engagement. The U.S.
Operation Just Cause: H-Hour Targets
capitalized on its advantages in delivery accuracy and stealth technology to surgically strike, while minimizing collateral damage and civilian casualties, in providing operational fires. Historically, JUST CAUSE marked the first shots fired in anger for two new fire support platforms, the Air Force's F-117 "Stealth" fighter and the Army's AH-64 "Apache" helicopter. 24 Additionally, the already-battle proven AC-130 "Spectre" gun ship proved invaluable as a premier fire support platform capable of pin-point precision in environments where the enemy air defense capability is negligible. Finally, the judicious use of highly trained, specially selected Special Operations Forces (SOF) for surgical ground strike operations all contributed to the precise engagement that allowed operational planners to shape the battlespace.
At first look, these weapon systems merely provided tactical fire support. From an operational standpoint, however, these aerial fire support platforms used emerging technology to locate, strike from extended ranges, ascertain battle damage, and reengage, when necessary, targets of operational significance.
The F-l 17 was chosen for its ability to bomb accurately at night. Rio Hato, Panama provided a perfect target for the Stealth's maiden run. It was a purely military complex, and with elite PDF units stationed there, suggested a savage fight. Also, it was slightly removed from a modest civilian populace. Tactical planners requested two 2,000 pound bombs dropped in support of the airborne and subsequent ground assault. One bomb on the arms room; the other on the main barracks, with the rationale that a weapon system is a person and his weapon. The destruction of either achieves the desired effect.
The operational commander (LTG Stiner), however, altered the fire support to achieve a different effect.
"...It would have been very easy just to go in there and blow those barracks off the map and kill everybody, but I didn 't want that. Our philosophy from the beginning was to minimize casualties, death, destruction and damage because this was a very unusual mission."
As a participant at the tactical level, I personally did (do) not agree with that decision and, to this day, believe that a more precise strike of the barracks at Rio Hato would have generated little political repercussion and reduced friendly casualties.
Nevertheless, a 2,000 pound bomb dropped 50 yards away from the main barracks in order to "stun" the PDF while 700 U.S. Army Rangers parachuted onto the nearby airfield. The second bomb impacted insignificantly on the beach over 300 yards from its intended target.
Extensive investigations followed as to why a bomb from this expensive platform missed its target. More serious inquiry pursued why the Air Force failed to report the incident. The investigations revealed some technical problems and poor command,
• control, and communications exacerbated by the highly classified and compartmented secrecy that shrouded the "Stealth" project in 1989.
The F-117 delivered 50% of its operational fires to the moderate satisfaction of the ground tactical commander but showed there was room for vast improvement in our ability with this system. Fortunately, lessons learned from this initial combat action in Panama improved our proficiency resulting in unbelievable success in the Gulf two years later.
The AH-64 "Apache" fared better in her baptism of fire. It too was chosen for its survivability and pinpoint accuracy, especially at night. Its ability, to launch high explosive "Hellfire" missiles into hardened targets, provided commanders with the ability to suppress enemy air defense during air ingress. Additionally, it could engage enemy armor in close proximity to buildings and people while minimizing collateral damage.
On the other hand, the Apache revealed deficiencies in use as a close air support platform due to the inability of thermal sites to distinguish enemy body heat from friendly. Finally, the use of well equipped, highly trained SOF units, trained to conduct close quarter battle, in urban terrain, at night provided operational planners with a very surgical force engagement capability that aerial platforms could not provide. Their ability to infiltrate and selectively engage enemy soldiers without injuring hostages or innocent bystanders provides the most quintessential model of precision engagement.
In summary, high-tech aerial weapon platforms (F-l 17, AH-64, AC-130) and SOF provided operational planners with the ability to precisely engage targets of operational and tactical significance while minimizing collateral damage and effectively protecting our own forces.
Full-Dimensional Protection
"...will be the control of the battlespace to ensure our forces can maintain freedom of action during deployment, maneuver and engagement, while providing multi-layered defenses for our forces and facilities at all levels. Full -dimensional protection will enable the effective employment of our forces while degrading opportunities for the enemy. ' In almost all cases, the precision engagement of enemy targets by high-tech weapons, described in the previous section, inherently provided protection to friendly forces. Despite one unfortunate exception (due to the inability of the SEALs to This criticism is founded. Operational planners were guilty of not thinking past the first few moves. The problem, however, comes from the paradox of destroying the enemy force that is also the security for civil infrastructure.
The lessons learned may be to plan for the pause between military success and subsequent anarchy. Front-load the military police and civil-military effort on the heels of assault troops to positively exploit success and quickly replace infrastructure. Earlier, the historical background of this paper explained that because of poor diplomatic relations with Panama, the President recalled the ambassador and reduced the embassy staff. Additionally, there was no political advisor on the JTF staff. These inadequacies resulted in a poor interagency effort to quickly embrace local civilian leadership and rebuild Panama. The previously discussed operational concepts, effectively employed in JUST CAUSE, were closely interrelated. Precision engagement suppressed enemy forces, while protecting friendly forces, and allowing successful maneuver. This section will address how focused logistics rendered the other concepts possible. Any successful operation has sound logistics support at its roots and JUST CAUSE was no different.
It is assumed that the special operators, paratroops, and light infantrymen were supported so well because many forces and assets were already in place. While this is Logistical support in JUST CAUSE significantly contributed to its success, however, operational planners enjoyed certain advantages from pre-positioned forces and materials. We must be careful not to learn the wrong logistical lessons from this conflict.
Other conflicts have and will provide challenges that tax the system to a greater extent.
Nevertheless, JUST CAUSE clearly demonstrated the high state of readiness of U.S.
support and air transport capabilities to provide focused logistics to the operation.
33
Conclusion
Operation JUST CAUSE was an overwhelming victory. "It was clearly a success, even a masterpiece, of operational art." 34 Strategic, operational, and tactical commanders effectively applied many operational concepts, most notably maneuver, firepower, protection and logistics highlighted in this paper. Were these leaders so prophetic or visionary as to plan and execute a major operation using a conceptual
template not yet written for another seven years? No, JV 2010 simply adds a high-tech flavor to a battle-proven recipe of operational planning tenets.
Despite this success, there were flaws. However, the modern spin that JV 2010 puts on established operational concepts may reveal answers or solutions to correct some problems that slightly tainted the triumph. The U.S. sustained casualties from friendly fire and that is always unacceptable. Full-dimensional protection may dictate highly innovative methods to discern friend from foe and shield ourselves from our own extremely lethal weapons. Despite huge improvements from URGENT FURY in Grenada, U.S. forces still experienced some communications interoperability issues.
Hopefully, standardized, joint methodology and training with the ultra-modern C4I equipment, alluded to in JV 2010, will make us better information warriors. Failure to plan for lack of civil and governmental instability, created by our overnight combat success, may be remedied with improved, experienced interagency action and focused logistics for a war-stricken civil populace in addition to sustaining friendly forces.
Our stewardship is to learn the appropriate lessons from this conflict as they apply to future endeavors. The U.S. military held a good hand in this one and had little excuse had it failed. Pre-positioned forces, technologically superior weapons, better trained and equipped troops, and established friendly installations virtually foreordained victory.
Effective application of JV 2010 concepts and other operational tenets in future conflicts will be necessary or the outcome may not be so one-sided.
